Warwick O’Neill, Military Historian

Imagine you’re a young 20 year old bloke. You’ve just struggled across sixty miles of some of the toughest terrain on earth. You’ve had bugger all training, your weapons are obsolete because you’re “just Militia” and all the best stuff is being used by the Second AIF in North Africa. But here you are on the pointy end of the attempt to defend Australia from direct attack. In front of you, heading your way, is the Japanese Army which has just swept through Malaya, captured Singapore, bungled General MacArthur out of the Philippines and have not known defeat so far in this war.

It’s all down to you and your mates, other young blokes from down Victoria way, with just a smattering of experienced older soldiers. How are you feeling about now? Not real flash I bet.

At the outbreak of war in 1939, Australia was again requested to raise of force of troops for deployment alongside British and other Commonwealth Forces against the forces of Germany. As in 1914 many young Australians rushed forward to join this new force, to show they were worthy to stand alongside their ANZAC fathers, or for the sense of adventure, or simply because it paid well, there were mouths to feed and maybe even an escape from a less than exciting life.

But for some, running off and fighting overseas didn’t seem like such a great idea. It certainly hadn’t done many favours for the ANZACs, many of whom were still suffering from their service. But these young fellas still felt a sense of duty and a desire to do their bit should Australia be threatened. So many joined the militia units springing up around the place.

As you would expect there was a bit of antagonism between the AIF lads and the militia lads. The militia could not be compelled to fight overseas, which led the AIF troops to give them titles such as chocolate soldiers (or chocos for short) meaning they’d melt when it gets too hot, or koalas – ie not to be exported or shot at. To their credit many of the militia stuck to their ideals and wouldn’t be goaded into joining the AIF.

So for a while, as far as the militia units were concerned, everything was going well. The war was all the way over there and Australia wasn’t directly threatened in any way. But then Japan started to pop up as a potential threat. Although nothing concrete had happened, the Government and military hob nobs suddenly started feeling a little insecure about the lack of forward defence of Australia. It was decided that a garrison force should be stationed in New Guinea to at least provide some sort of token attempt at defence.

But who to send? Couldn’t send the AIF. They were busy elsewhere. So who else? Ahh the Militia. “But”, I hear you ask, “I thought you said they couldn’t be compelled to fight overseas.” And you’d be right. But as part of the spoils of WW1, Australia was granted certain rights over the former German territory of New Guinea. This worked out well for the aforementioned Government and military hob nobs, because that technically meant it was Australian soil and therefore the militia could be sent to defend it. The sneaky buggers.

The 39^th Militia Battalion was formed in Victoria in October to November 1941 from various local militia units. The Battalion was sent to Port Moresby to act as a garrison force alongside the 53^rd Militia Battalion. The difference between these two Battalions could not have been more striking. The junior and senior officers of the 39^th were determined that their men would be as battle ready as they could be made. They were drilled regularly, given what weapons training could be arranged and the men grew to have confidence in themselves and their leaders.

The 53^rd on the other hand had leaders who were content to have the troops digging holes, unloading ships and just being general labour around the Port. Their officers seemed to treat it all as a bit of a lark. When push came to shove the predictable result happened, the 53^rd crumbled. But as Napoleon once said, there’s no such thing as bad troops only bad officers. So unlike some other commentators, I’m not going to bag the troops and will leave it at that.

While stationed in Port Moresby the militia troops had their first taste of warfare when Japanese bombers began targeting the port facilities, in a softening up prior to a planned invasion of the southern side of New Guinea. The eventual Japanese landing was thwarted at the Battle of Milne Bay. Being denied their first option, the Japanese decided an overland attack was required. The allied forces also foresaw this and so decided to send a force to guard the airfield at the little plantation village known as Kokoda.

With their only available choices being the 39^th or the 53^rd, the 39^th got the nod. I’ve stumbled across a document titled Fighting in New Guinea – Narrative of the 39^th Battalion which appears to have been written by a Lt Col Witton, although it’s difficult to make out the signature. However in that document the author states:

“The 39 Bn had been in New Guinea about seven months. All ranks had trained hard in the same manner as other bns, had prepared and occupied beach posns and exercised constantly in patrol and movt. They had more than a nodding acquaintance with Jap bombs and had experienced the thrill of seeing Jap fighters crash in flames as a result of their machine gun fire.”

He goes on to say:

“All this had created an aggressive attitude in the minds of all ranks. Firstly they had become sufficiently familiar with the country to dominate their environment and feel more or less at home in the bush. Secondly they wanted to get the Jap on the end of their foresights. They wanted to meet him and beat him.”

Stirring stuff, but is probably more of an effort of a commander to talk up his troops than an accurate reflection of the feelings of the troops. First up, no one dominates the Owen Stanley Range. And although I have no doubt they were in an aggressive frame of mind and determined to do their best, I can’t imagine too many of them were as enthusiastic to meet the Japanese as is portrayed here. I shall return to this quote later in the article to hopefully explain what I think was going on when this was written. But for now – troops confident, happily going to meet the enemy.

The 39^th was combined with the Papuan Infantry Battalion to form Maroubra Force. B Company of the 39th led the way into the mountains carrying pretty close to 20 kilos each of personal equipment, weapons and ammunition. 20 kilos doesn’t sound like too much, but after two days of carrying that weight up and down 1000 feet ascents and descents, it became clear that if they were going to arrive at the destination in anything resembling fighting condition, then the load would need to be lightened. Native carriers took up the burden in what would become one of the enduring features of the New Guinea campaign – primitive villagers working hand in hand with modern soldiers taking supplies up and eventually taking wounded back.

After six days struggling through the jungles and over the hills, the troops finally came out of the mountains and onto the plains with the forward-most elements reaching Awala. There they met up with a carrying party bringing in supplies which were landed at Buna shortly before the Japanese landed just to the North at Gona.

On 23 July, B Company, under the command of Captain Sam Templeton, met the Japanese for the first time. Having successfully met up with the supply party, and knowing the Japanese would soon be heading their way in strength, B Company destroyed a bridge over the Kumusi River. They saw a patrol of roughly 50 enemy on the opposite bank and opened fire, killing a number of them and the survivors retreated.   

It was a good start to proceedings but was to be short lived. Hundreds of Japanese marines soon began to cross the river under heavy mortar and machine gun fire, and the small band of Australians was never going to hold them off for long.

The first of many strategic withdrawals was made to a position at Oivi where Templeton set up an ambush. The Company managed to halt the Japanese advance throughout the afternoon, but by early evening it was clear the Japanese were working their way around the flanks and Captain Templeton took it upon himself to make his way back to Battalion HQ to ask for reinforcements. He didn’t make it.

For the remainder of the Company, it was obvious the position was about to be surrounded and they had to either get out or be annihilated. A native lad named Sanope led them down a small track and after a day and half they were able to re-join the main track near Denika.

Meanwhile, with the little village of Kokoda and its airfield secure for the time being, a platoon of D Company was flown in along with Colonel Owen. Owen took command of about 80 men from B Company who had been left at the village and prepared to defend against the imminent Japanese assault on the village. They set up their main defensive position on a spur line on the eastern side of the runway.

The Japanese attack came on the evening of 29 July. The initial assault came in during the late afternoon with trumpet calls and shouting as the Japanese soldiers surged towards the defences. After a brief, but violent encounter, sometimes hand-to-hand, the Japanese fell back.

Then, under the cover of darkness the main attack came in, with a quieter approach along the spur line. This would be the standard Japanese tactic throughout the following campaign. Launch a probing attack of sufficient size to oblige the defenders to open up with everything they have, determine the defensive layout and then send in the main attack while attempting encirclement.

The defenders resisted strongly with rifle and machine gun fire. A steady stream of grenades were hurled with accuracy towards the Japanese, with Colonel Owen adding his own throwing arm to the enterprise. The Japanese were temporarily halted but soon renewed their efforts. Again they were greeted with strong small arms fire and grenades. Colonel Owen’s luck though was about to run out.

While in the act of throwing a grenade the Colonel was shot in the forehead. He was taken back to the hut which was being used as a hospital and the seventy year old doctor, Doc Vernon did his best to save Owen, working under a light held by his assistant. But it was hopeless, and Colonel Owen died on the table.

Now that raises an interesting point. Owen was taken to a hut in the village where Doc Vernon had set up a makeshift hospital, basically in the middle of a battle zone. This seventy year old man was performing surgery while a battle raged a short distance away. That he could remain calm enough and steady enough to perform delicate operations is quite amazing.

By 01:00am, after eight hours of near continuous fighting it was obvious the defensive position of Kokoda was becoming untenable. The Japanese were working their way around the flanks and if they managed to reach the only track out of town, the garrison would be surrounded and destroyed. The order to withdraw to the next defensive position, a mile back along the track to Deniki, was given.

A brief lull in the fighting ensued as the Japanese main force moved in to occupy the village. Meanwhile, Major Allan Cameron, Brigade Major of 30^th Brigade lobbed at Deniki on 4^th August. There he saw the battered remains of B Company and was disgusted by their apparently ‘unsoldierly’ appearance. He jumped to the conclusion that these men must’ve run away from the fighting and had abandoned Kokoda village for no reason. He sent them back to Isurava in disgrace, thereby depriving the remainder of the 39^th of the only troops with battle experience.

This wouldn’t be the last time that a textbook tactical withdrawal would be mistaken for cowardice.

Cameron then decided that the village must be recaptured.

A small reconnaissance consisting of Lieutenant Johnston and a couple of diggers was sent out to have a look around. They managed to work their way through the sentry positions but their presence was given away by a breaking branch. Fortunately they were so far into the Japanese position, with enemy soldiers all around them that the Japanese were unable to open fire for fear of shooting their own. So instead…..they threw stones. It must’ve been a near farcical scene. Three Aussies surrounded by some of the best jungle fighting troops in the world, dodging rocks. And to make it even better, they managed to escape. Legends.

So after miraculously giving the Japanese the slip, the trio spent the remainder of the night resting in the jungle before attempting to find their way back to Battalion. In the morning they carefully set off, but soon heard a murmur of voices ahead and saw a party waiting to ambush them on the lower side of a track. They ummed and ahhhed about what to do. They couldn’t take on the ambush by themselves, but if they attempted to give it a wide berth then they’d be too late to give useful information to the rest of the Battalion before they launched their attack.

Fortunately, while engaged in this discussion they saw scouts from C Company making their way down the track. This forced their hand to some degree because if they did nothing the C Company patrol would stumble right into the ambush. They decided to give C Company a bit of a warning and waited until they were close enough to engage the ambush. Johnston then fired off a single shot to alert the patrol.

The poor Japanese soldiers must’ve been thrown into total confusion, thinking the enemy was in front of them, only to be fired upon from behind. What to do? Turn around and engage the ones behind, however many that may be? Ignore them and focus on the ones to the front? Say bugger it and try to get out best they could?

The C Company lads, although surprised, were quick to react and poured fire into the position. The Japanese fled in most haste, hotly pursued for a short distance. The end result was five enemy dead and an unknown number wounded. Johnston was able to relay his information to Cameron and a battle plan to retake Kokoda was drafted.

Major Cameron sent half of his force under Lieutenant Johnston to make an attack from the left and then to move forward while the others attacked directly under the command of Captain Deane. As the central force came to a small depression, Japanese snipers began taking pot-shots. Deane, who was just about to order his men forward, was hit by a sniper. This galvanised the troops and both the flanking group under Johnston and the central group rushed forward, firing from the hip and yelling sweet nothings at the Japanese. The Japanese pulled back leaving behind 52 dead. The C Company attack managed to secure a foothold adjacent to the airstrip.

While C Company was doing its thing, D Company under Captain Bidstrup pushed along the Oiva track where they encountered a smaller Japanese force and soon put them to flight.

A Company under Captain Symington followed D Company then took a left turn to push in the direction of a rubber plantation on the eastern side of Kokoda. The advance guard was ordered to “push on, punish and penetrate”. They came into contact with the enemy and held on until the main body joined them and swept forward, advancing in groups of two to three. The Japanese fled but unknowingly ran into an ambush which Symington had ordered to be set up on the escape route.

Those who escaped this ambush then encountered the troops of D Company. All up, A and D Companies accounted for around 180 dead. The Australian troops spent the remainder of the day digging in and securing their gains.

The Japanese counter attacked the following day but were easily repulsed, despite displaying field craft and patience in moving forward, pretty much unnoticed until the time of the attack. Fighting continued throughout the night and the following day. The Australian defences were strong, but the primary issue which would dog both sides during the campaign was beginning to show – the difficulty of supply.

The Kokoda airfield was surrounded by Australian troops, however the perimeter wasn’t wide enough to allow supply aircraft to land and unload unimpeded. Several attempts were made, however it was deemed too dangerous and the planes turned for home, full of much needed ammunition. With the Japanese overland supply route being much shorter than the Australians, it become obvious by the third day that Kokoda could not be held.

Captain Symington began withdrawing A Company from the south west of the plateau in three groups. The first group carried captured equipment and weapons, the second carrying the wounded and the third acting as the rear guard. The first group was ordered to attack any enemy who crossed their paths and accounted for around 20 Japanese soldiers, clearing the way for the second group. Eventually, the entire Company was back on the track to Deniki.

C and D Companies also withdrew and re-joined the Battalion at Deniki while at the same time, E Company were moving up from Isurava. The Japanese attacked at Deniki and was again repulsed but it soon became apparent the even Deniki couldn’t be held and the much better option was to the south at Isurava, where it was understood that troops from the experienced 2/14^th and 2/16^th Battalions of the AIF were making their way. 

So far the fighting had claimed an estimated 500 Japanese lives for the loss of 41 Australians. But those Australians who were still alive were in a sorry state. Weeks of trudging through the jungle, two hard fought battles and just the strain of being in the jungle were starting to tell. Many who were still fighting were carrying at least one wound and some small groups had been separated during the retreat.

It was in this stage that the 39^th began to prepare for its next big test – the defence of Isurava. It was also at this point that the true spirit of the 39^th showed itself in an extraordinary act of devotion.

During the withdrawal the rear guard units were struggling to hold off the advancing Japanese. Back at Isurava a regimental aid post had been established and there were a number of wounded men who had done their bit and now had their chance to be patched up and sent further back and away from the fighting.

Then news of the desperate fight by the rear guard came through. The 39^th was still fighting hard. With the enemy pushing onwards the militia refused to give up. But it was obvious they needed help if they were going to hold them for long enough to allow time for the AIF Battalions to enter the fight. The only troops who could help were those wounded men at the Isurava RAP. One by one, those men who could still walk to some degree, picked up their rifles and their kit and headed back towards the fighting. These men definitely were not chocolate soldiers.

And it worked. The tenacious fighting withdrawal forced the Japanese to stop their advance in order to reorganise for a concentrated effort against Isurava. There was a precious two week lull in the fighting, during which time the 53^rd Militia and the AIF 30^th Brigade Headquarters reached Isurava.

Just as important, from the 39^th Battalion’s perspective was the arrival of Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Honner who took command on 16^th August. Honner had proven himself to a be a brilliant leader of soldiers in the Middle East. He had a way of inspiring confidence in his troops, not through bluster and bullshit, but with a quiet authority. Most of all, he loved his troops and they in turn came to love him.

On 23 August, command of Maroubra Force was handed to Brigadier Arnold Potts, who was also to prove himself the right man in the right place at the right time. Unfortunately for Potts he would eventually pay the price for his success, not at the hands of his enemy, but at the hands of his own Commanding Officer. But again, more on that later.

But before I end this episode I just want to clarify my earlier comments about Lt Col Witton’s letter and his comments about the enthusiasm of the men to ‘get at the Jap’.

This document was written in October 1942, after the 39^th had been relieved and made their way back after the fighting at Isurava. It may have been written in response to criticism of the conduct of all Australian forces involved in those opening stages of the campaign.

The infamous Koitaki incident in which General Blamey all but accused the men of Maroubra Force of cowardice occurred in November 1942. Completely ignorant of the conditions, the strained supply chain and numerical superiority of the Japanese forces, Blamey sacked Brigadier Potts and blasted the survivors of Maroubra Force, allegedly saying “it’s the rabbit who runs that gets shot, not the man with the gun.”

In light of this, as the 39^th would’ve been the first unit to return from the battlefront, it’s not too much of a stretch to assume they would’ve heard the rumblings of discontent before Blamey arrived. It’s possible Lt Col Witton may have been launching a pre-emptive defence of the 39^th, leading to him over stating their enthusiasm.

Regardless of this, their tenacity in meeting the Japanese attack front on and fighting until continuing to do so would result in their own destruction, shows that although they may not exactly have been chomping at the bit, they did an extraordinary job and played a major role in the eventual defeat of the Japanese. If it hadn’t been for these men, the outcome of the war could’ve been drastically different.

Other military items by the author, Warwick O’Neill, can be found at: https://www.australianmilitaryhistorypodcast.com/
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