As an Australian military history nut, I like to think I know at least something about most of our major military actions since the late 1800s. No expert mind you, but at least an idea of what each one was about and maybe even an anecdote or two. But I must confess, when it comes to the Malayan Emergency, my knowledge amounts to a vague understanding that there was such a thing, and that Australians were involved. I really know bugger all about it, despite my former father-in-law being on one of our naval vessels involved at the time.
So what better opportunity to fill in that missing piece of my history puzzle for myself than to try and explain to you what it was all about? So here we go, the Malayan Emergency.
The first thing to clear up is the name of this event. From the British/Commonwealth perspective it has always been the Malayan Emergency. But, from the other perspective it is known as the Anti-British National Liberation War. That alone should give an idea of some of the main issues to be resolved.
But to get a full understanding of what the situation was in 1948 we need to go back further, all the way back to pre-WW2 Malaya.
The Malayan economy at that stage was focussed primarily around mining and rubber. The British had control of the Malayan peninsula since the late 18th Century and as they were wont to do, they taxed the bejesus out of the locals. Over the years this led many Malayan people into poverty. Then over the 1920’s and 1930’s Chinese migrant workers started working in the tin mines and other resource areas and created more tension as the Chinese were replacing Malays in those lucrative industries. The Malays were relegated to the less lucrative rubber trade.
Then along came World War Two and the Japanese very quickly seized the entirety of the Peninsula and Singapore Island. With the Japanese occupation, all international trade from the mines and rubber plantations ground to a halt, with only Japanese needs being met. The rubber industry essentially collapsed and mining wound down as equipment wore out and wasn’t replaced. As well as the equipment breaking down, the people themselves began to focus their efforts on simple survival and so many skills were lost. It didn’t bode well for post war Malaya.
With the Japanese out, the social and economic problems caused by the occupation meant that Malaya was a mess. Unemployment, poverty, inflation all combined to make life for your average citizen pretty tough. This was also the era where Communism was attempting to spread across Asia and the Malayan Communist Party, MCP saw an opportunity to show how Western capitalism was failing the people of Malaya.
The MCP started stirring up trouble, organising strikes, which were dealt with pretty harshly, which then resulted in more strikes etc etc as the story goes on. The British also attempted to form the Malayan Union, whereby all citizens, be they of Malay, Chinese or Indian origin would all be equal under the law. Strangely enough indigenous Malays weren’t particularly happy about this, again seeing their lands being parcelled out to non-Malays by an overseas entity.
So the British reneged on the Malay Union, which upset the Chinese who saw it as a betrayal by Britain, considering the Chinese had taken on most of the fighting to rid Malaya of the Japanese. All in all, it was basically a basket case all round.
The already fraught situation took a nosedive to rock-bottom on 16 June 1948. Elphil Estate was a British owned rubber plantation outside the town of Sungai Siput in the Perak region towards the northeast of the Peninsula. At 8:30 am, plantation managers Arthur Walker, John Allison and an assistant, Ian Christian, were working away in the office when three Chinese men casually walked into the office, said “good morning” to Walker and then promptly shot the three Britons.
A simultaneous attack was planned for a neighbouring plantation; however, the plantation manager’s vehicle had broken down during his morning inspection and so he wasn’t in the office when the other group of Chinese paid him a visit. Seeing the office unattended they left.
In response, two days later the British administrators enacted emergency measures in the region and later extended those measures to include the entire country. The MCP was outlawed, and police were given authority to arrest MCP members or anyone suspected of providing assistance to the Communists. Many MCP members headed for the hills, so to speak, and under the leadership of Chin Peng, the Secretary General of the now outlawed MCP, to form the Malayan People’s Liberation Army, the MPLA.
It’s just occurred to me where I’ve heard the MPLA before. The Sex Pistols Anarchy in the UK mentions them in the line “is this the MPLA, is this the UDA, is this the IRA, I thought it was the UK…”
Anyway, enough digression.
Many of the MPLA members were veterans of the fighting which expelled the Japanese and so were well experienced in the art of insurgency and guerrilla fighting in the Malay jungles. The scene was set for the first real showdown between Western Capitalism versus Eastern Communism in Asia.
So with that quick description of events leading up to the Emergency, which officially ran from 1948 to 1960 but in reality continued until 1989, out of the way, let’s bring our focus back to what this article is all about – the Australian involvement.
Australia committed army, navy and air force units to the emergency which lasted 13 years, between 1950 and 1963. It was the longest continuous military commitment in Australia’s history at the time. This record lasted until our involvement in Afghanistan commencing in 2001.
The RAAF was first to arrive. First time for everything, am I right fellow soldiers? Hey? Hey? Sorry, now back to being professional.
Number 38 Squadron arrived in 1950 with its Dakota transport aircraft and 1 Squadron rocked in with half a dozen Lincoln Bombers. The Dakotas were employed with cargo transport and troop movement. They flew British paratroopers to their allotted drop zones, mainly in the Perak area and took part in that old mid-20th Century favourite, the dropping of propaganda pamphlets.
On the topic of pamphlets. They were dropped all over the joint during World War 2, Malaya, Korea and Vietnam. But is there any evidence to suggest they made any difference? Has anyone ever actually picked up one of these things, read it and then thought to themselves “you know what, they’re right. This random piece of paper prepared and dropped by my enemy has made me completely re-think my ideological stance. How foolish was I to take up arms in defence of that stance. I’ll pack up and head home now.” Do you reckon it ever happened?
Back to the narrative.
The Lincolns flew strategic bombing missions in direct support of British and Commonwealth troops, and local police units once the situation on the ground settled into something of a routine. One such operation was codenamed Operation Termite, a large-scale operation in July 1954 which involved dropping 200 British Paratroopers into the jungle and bombing known Communist camps. In the final wash up only 13 Communists were confirmed killed, however 181 camps had been destroyed, which as you can imagine would’ve put a fair dent in the capabilities.
It wasn’t until October 1955 that Australian boots started crunching the ground in Malaya with the arrival of the 2nd Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment (2RAR), forming part of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade. By this stage the Communists had largely been contained and all that was left to do was stamp out the few pockets remaining and to maintain a presence in the area. This actually proved to be more difficult and time consuming that first thought.
Up to this point the Commonwealth tactics had been your standard large units, with all available support possible, bludgeoning a given area. But with the lack of a real front line, highly mobile enemy and tight/restrictive jungle this approach was proving less and less effective. A different approach was needed.
A system of intensive patrolling, observation, ambushing and maintaining perimeter guards around villages was developed. The intent was to deny the insurgents secure bases from which to operate and to limit freedom of movement through the jungle.
It had limited success. For starters, contacts were few and far between. There was a lot of jungle and only a small number of troops to patrol it. And when there were contacts the result wasn’t always in the Australian’s favour. On one occasion, on 25 June 1956, a platoon ambushed an insurgent patrol and although two insurgents were killed 2 RAR lost three.
But they were learning lessons which would stand the Australian army in good stead in a later war.
In October 1957 2 RAR was replaced by 3 RAR. After a few weeks’ jungle training and familiarising themselves with the lay of the land, 3 RAR began its activities. The prolonged pressure applied to the communists by the British and Commonwealth forces and Malay police was starting to bear fruit, and 3 RAR were able to force the insurgents further into the jungles. This made it increasingly difficult for the insurgents to access food and ammunition and to communicate effectively enough to put up a solid defence. In April 1959, the Perak region was declared free from communist influence.
3 RAR left the scene in October 1959 and were replace by 1 RAR. 1 RAR patrolled the border area between Malaya and Thailand extensively throughout their stay, however made no contact with the enemy. It was suspected that the communists were operating from bases over the border in Thailand, however as they were forbidden from crossing the border they could do little to intervene.
Throughout 1959 and into 1960 the situation stabilised and on 31st July 1960 the Malayan Government declared the emergency over. 1 RAR remained in Malaya until October 1961, keeping an eye on things and generally waiting to see if the Communist would attempt to reassert themselves. 2 RAR took over, operating in the Perlis and Kedah regions until they returned to Australia in August 1963.
Obviously, it wasn’t only the Air Force and Army involved throughout the Emergency, the Navy also did its bit. The destroyers Warramunga and Arunta lobbed in 1955 and began the RAN’s involvement. Over the next fifteen years the aircraft carriers (yes we used to have some) Melbourne and Sydney, as well as the destroyers Anzac, Quadrant, Queenborough, Quiberon, Quickmatch, Tobruk, Vampire, Vendetta and Voyager all put in an appearance and did what they could. It has to be said though, for an operation primarily fought in jungle terrain, there wasn’t much the navy could do as far as direct support is concerned, however the Destroyers did, on occasion fire on Communist positions along the coast.
Engineers from the RAAF and Army built a runway for use by the Air Force at what became known as the Butterworth Air Base. In 1973 and Australian Army infantry company was formed, called Rifle Company Butterworth. Imaginative title huh? The company was deployed to Butterfield to act as a base protection and a quick-reaction force when the Communist insurgency had another crack at things. In 1988, Butterworth was handed over to the Royal Malaysian Air Force and the insurgency was declared officially over in 1989. However, as it was a pretty handy base for these kinds of things, Australian soldiers maintained a presence at Butterworth to provide Diggers with jungle warfare training.
In total thirty-nine Australians died over the entirety of our involvement in Malaya, although only fifteen died in the conduct of operations. A further twenty-seven were wounded.
In the big scheme of things, it was a fairly small contribution to a bit of a minor incident, although for the people of Malaya it was obviously a vital part of their history. But from a military point of view the lessons learned from the Malayan emergency stood the Australian Army in good stead for their future involvement in Vietnam. Their Malayan experience showed the effectiveness of smaller, platoon-sized operations. It honed their jungle fighting knowledge, first learned in the jungles of New Guinea. As a result, it could be argued that our involvement in Malaya probably reduced our casualties in Vietnam, particularly in the early stages of that war. Remember that Major Harry Smith, the commander on the ground during the Battle of Long Tan, served with the 2nd Battalion in Malaya.
As I said at the start, Malaya was the longest running conflict involving Australian troops until Afghanistan. The tactics and strategies developed over that time set in place the way the Australian Army operated for much of the remainder of the 20th Century. I can certainly see parallels between what I’ve read about our Malayan operations and what I was taught as a young soldier in the early 90’s. I always assumed those tactics were learned in Vietnam. Turns out they go back further than that.
A pretty good legacy for a largely forgotten conflict.
Other military items by the author, Warwick O’Neill, can be found at: https://www.australianmilitaryhistorypodcast.com/
You can read more about the author, Warwick O’Neill, here.
